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  The Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998 marked a major watershed in the 
history of East Asia regionally and nationally.    The crisis marked the beginning of East 
Asian regionalism and Japan’s new regional engagement.    It also marked the end of the 
authoritarian developmental state in Indonesia and the near collapse of its Malaysian 
counterpart.    The crisis was dealt with at two levels.    It was dealt with regionally and 
globally by the IMF, the US and Japan, and it was dealt with nationally by national 
governments in consultation and negotiation with the IMF.    On the regional and global 
level, Japan became increasingly frustrated with the way in which the crisis was dealt 
with by the IMF and the US, in part because of the different understanding of the nature 
of the crisis and in part because of the different interests Japan had in the region.   
Japan worked with the IMF when Thailand fell in crisis, acquiesced with the IMF policy 
when Indonesia went to the IMF for assistance, and chose to support Mahathir in 
disagreement with the US when Malaysia fell in crisis in 1998.    This cooperation and 
rivalry between Japan and the US (with the IMF as its proxy) affected the way in which 
the crisis ran its course in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, even though the political 
economic structure in each country was of prime importance.    In Thailand, a coalition 
government willing to work with the IMF and Japan had to be in place to introduce 
reforms as required by the IMF conditionality and was supported by Japan with the new 
Miyazawa Initiative; Soeharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia was too rotten for any 
rescue measures and had to go; while in Malaysia Japan’s support with the new 
Miyazawa Initiative was decisive in the survival of Mahathir and the NF regime under 
his  leadership.   
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In retrospect, it is clear that the crisis in 1997-1998 marked a major watershed 
in the history of East Asia regionally and nationally.    The ASEAN plus 3 (China, Japan 
and Korea, that is) framework, inaugurated with the first summit meeting held in 
December 1997, has become institutionalized since, with the annual summit and 
ministerial  meetings.  The  crisis  marked the beginning of Japan’s new regional 
engagement, as evidenced by its call in 1997 for the establishment of the Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF), the new Miyazawa initiative in 1998 to stimulate economies hit 
by the crisis, the Chiengmai Initiative it promoted in 2000 as a mechanism to create a 
zone of currency stability, the conclusion of the Japan Singapore Economic Partnership 
Agreement in 2001 and the proposal Prime Minister Koizumi made in Singapore in 
2001 for the Japan-ASEAN economic partnership as the first step to build an East Asian 
community.    The crisis also marked the end of the era of authoritarian developmental 
states with the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia and the near 
collapse of Mahathir’s National Front regime in Malaysia.     
In many studies published since the crisis, all these developments have been 
discussed separately, because they were understood to belong to different series – 
namely, the regional system, Japan’s engagement with the region, and national political 
economic structures.    But in fact, these developments intersected with each other to 
produce outcomes as we know now, because Japan and the US with the IMF as its 
proxy were two major players shaping the ways in which the crisis was dealt with 
regionally and nationally .    This was most clearly demonstrated in 1998 when 
Malaysia went into crisis with the ouster of Anwar Ibrahim as deputy prime minister 
and the imposition of capital control and when the Japanese government announced the 
new Miyazawa initiative and came to the rescue of the Malaysian government under 
Mahathir, while making a deal with the US.    Why did Japan do what it did in the crisis, 
then, and what were its regional and national consequences?  This  essays  examines 
these questions, first looking at the cooperation and rivalry between Japan and the 




Japan and the US in the crisis   3
When the crisis started in Thailand in July 1997, Japan reacted to it very 
quickly.  The  Japanese  government  had  known it was coming – the Thai government 
had consulted with it in June - and had already decided to work with the IMF.    When 
the Thai government decided to float Thai Baht and came to the IMF for assistance, 
Japan hosted the meeting in Tokyo to conclude a rescue package for Thailand in 
cooperation with the IMF in August, and in view of the fact that it would not be the last 
currency crisis in the region, called for the creation of Asian Monetary Fund.    But the 
proposed AMF was shot down by the US and the IMF in October 1997.    In the same 
month Japan also had to acquiesce with the conditionality the IMF negotiated with the 
Indonesian government and which it did not agree with and which it saw leading to the 
collase of the banking sector and the deepening crisis in Indonesia.    With the 
regionalization of internationally competitive Japanese industries, Japan had (and still 
has) vital interests in the region and now found itself increasingly in disagreement with 
the IMF and the US about the way to deal with the deepening and expanding crisis.   
The Japanese government thus decided on emergency measures to stabilize Southeast 
Asian economies in February 1998. When it announced a comprehensive economic 
policy package in April 1998, it included measures in support of East Asian countries.   
And finally when Malaysia fell in crisis, Japan decided to support Mahathir’s Malaysia 
in disagreement with the US with the new Miyazawa  Initiative.  In its handling of the 
crisis, therefore, two things stand out.    First, the crisis years saw the increasing 
frustration and alienation of Japan from the US and its proxy, the IMF.    Second, Japan 
approached the question regionally and strategically from the outset, while locating 
bilateral relations in this larger regional framework.    This led to the creation of the 
ASEAN plus 3 and the introduction of the new Miyazawa Initiative, which in turn 
paved the way for the Chiengmai Initiative.     
Why, then, did Japan do as it did?   
Needless to say, Japan did not have complete freedom of action in the region, 
whether it was in trade and investment, in finance, or in security.  Its  action  was 
constrained by the US and it consequently had to negotiate with America in engaging 
the region within the structure which was also essentially of the US making.    This 
structure was created under American hegemony at the onset of the Cold War.    It was 
informed by the US double containment strategy, that is the containment of China and 
the Soviet Union and the containment of Japan, with the revival of Japan as an   4
economic powerhouse and a perennial junior partner which would never pose a threa to 
the US hegemonic position in the region.    This structure was based on two 
architectures, the regional security structure built on bilateral security treaties and bases 
agreements (of which the US-Japan security treaty was the most strategic) and the 
regional economic structure built on the US-Japan-Southeast Asian triangular trade 
system.    Japan as No. 2 occupied a crucial position in this regional structure, which in 
turn shaped the way in which Japan engaged the region for many years.
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  We do not need to dwell for long on the regional security structure and 
Japan’s position in it, for it is still dominated by the US.    China can aspire to challenge 
the US hegemony in the region many years from now, but can not do much for now.   
Its defense forces being fully integrated into the US-led regional military structure, 
Japan remains a semi-soverign state, and despite the call for Japan to be a “normal” 
state, the US-Japanese alliance remains central to Japan’s global and regional 
engagement as attested by the US-Japan guidelines concluded in the post-Cold War era 
and the measures it took in support of the US war on terror in Afganistan and Iraq more 
recently. 
      More important for the purpose of our discussion is the regional economic 
structure.    The word “Southeast Asia” was crucial to its creation.    “Southeast Asia” 
was a neologism which gained instant currency in 1945-1950.    Before that, the region 
was called, together with China, “China and its vicinities.”    When China went 
communist in 1949, this phrase lost its geopolitical relevance.    The word “Southeast 
Asia” was coined to inform the US Asia strategy to contain China, to revive Japan as 
“the workshop of Asia” (and the US logistical base in Asia), to develop Southeast Asia, 
and to create a triangular trade system between the US, Japan and Southeast Asia. 
  The postwar Japanese-Southeast Asian relationship evolved within this 
structure.    Economic reconstruction was the prime objective of Japan’s postwar 
conservative coalition.    The politics of productivity informed its strategy.      As 
Charles Maier put it, it was a politics to transform political issues into problems of 
output, to adjourn class conflict for a consensus on growth.
ii    It was predicated on the 
conservative, pro-business conception of the national interest.    Central to this 
conception were the twin goals of economic growth and industrial transformation.   
Foreign economic policies were integral to this  strategy.  Southeast  Asia  offered  an 
important arena for its “economic cooperation.”    Japan benefited enormously from the   5
evolving and expanding trade relations among the US, Japan and Southeast Asia. 
  The regional structure and Japan’s position in it powerfully influenced the 
manner in which Japan engaged the region.    To understand this point, it is useful to 
compare East Asia with Europe and Japan with Germany.    The European regional 
structure was built on two collective institutions of the NATO and the EU, which 
facilitated an institutionalized integration process and embedded Germany in Europe.   
The East Asian regional structure which was originally built on a collection of bilateral 
security relations and a triangular trade system worked against far-reaching 
institutionalization of East Asian regional integration and left Japan more isolated 
politically in the region.     
Japan and Germany thus engaged Asia and Europe differently.    Asia’s 
network-style market integration made it possible for Japan to engage Asia through 
economic instrumentalities such as trade, investment, and aid to lead “from behind,” 
which was in clear difference from Germany’s deep entanglement in the European 
Union.    This also shaped the economic and political interests Japan pursued in Asia.   
Japan’s economic position was best served by “shallow” rules with the WTO as the 
anchor of the international trade system and marked by the absence of intrusive regional 
arrangements.    The close connection between Japan’s economic cooperation and 
corporate strategies was well suited to circumvent entry barriers to and operational 
obstacles in foreign markets through informal, bilateral channels.    Japan did not need 
deeper trade integration as Germany did in order to establish market access for Japanese 
producers. 
  Regional economic development in the late 1980s and 1990s reinforced this 
mode of Japanese engagement with East Asia, while redefining its guiding concept, 
economic cooperation.    This should be clear if we recall what happened in those years.   
The region-wide economic dynamism with its ever expanding frontiers stretching from 
the Asian NICs to Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, to the coastal regions of China, 
the Philippines and Vietnam and beyond excited Japan.    Seen from Tokyo, this “flying 
geese pattern” regional economic development meant ever expanding possibilities for 
Japanese business at a time when the Japanese economic “bubble” burst and Japan 
experienced the worst recession in the postwar era.    This regional economic 
development was in part driven by Japanese FDIs which reached over $67 billion in 
1990, over five times the level of 1985 and which led to the regionalization of Japan’s   6
internationally competitive industries in East Asia.     
  This gave rise to a new reality.    Japanese manufacturing industries, the 
mainstay of Japan’s economy and hence national welfare, became regionally embedded.     
This led to the redefinition of Japan’s economic cooperation, in which Japan’s economic 
cooperation no longer meant trade promotion and resource procurement as it did in the 
1960s and 1970s, but the encouragement and promotion of regional economic 
development with Japanese FDIs, Japanese aid for industrial, infrastructural and human 
resources development, and Japanese imports from Asian NICs and ASEAN countries.   
It was in essense the extension of its politics of productivity beyond Japanese borders 
onto the region, though developmental states in East Asia remained authoritarian in 
those days.    MITI’s New Aid Plan, announced in 1987, was an early attempt to 
translate this new notion of economic cooperation into a policy package.      It sought to 
combine the resources of the Japanese state -- aid, technical cooperation, and measures 
to open Japanese markets -- with private capital and technology.    Its aim was to 
develop East Asian economies in such a way that, at the very least, they would enhance 
the ongoing restructuring of the Japanese economy by establishing lower-cost 
component-making and export bases for Japan’s manufacturing industries throughout 
East Asia.     
Japan thus staked its economy and welfare on Asian economic dynamism.   
As Prime Minister Hashimoto said in his speech in Singapore in January 1997, Asian 
economic dynamism ushered in a new era in which a new “broader and deeper” 
partnership between Japan and ASEAN was called for, because “stability and 
development in Asia are prerequisites for Japan’s stability and development, and it is 
self-evident that the two are inseparable.”
iii 
This statement was made half a year before the crisis hit the region, and 
though not very many people may remember it now, it remains a most succinct 
statement about Japan’s interests in the region.    What Japan did in dealing with the 
crisis needs to be understood in this context.    It was clear from the outset that the 
region, now economically integrated, was vulnerable to the crisis and that the crisis 
would also be a big blow to Japanese firms and financial institutions which had 
regionalized their operations in the pre-crisis years.    Being aware for quite some time 
that the crisis was in the making, the Japanese government reacted to it promptly when 
it hit Thailand and came to its rescue together with the IMF, hosting the meeting in   7
Tokyo in August 1997 and coming up with the rescue package in which Japan and the 
IMF provided $4 billion each in support of Thailand.  The  Thai  government  initially 
wanted to deal with the currency crisis through foreign reserve borrowing and joint 
interventions in the foreign exchange market, while the IMF insisted on budget 
tightening and the floating of Tahi Baht.    Japan sided with the IMF because it had to 
rely on the IMF to find out about the state of Thai foreign reserves and market 
interventions and because it was too risky to provide support to Thailand without the 
IMF and the US.     
Working with the IMF, however, meant that Japan was constrained in its 
action by the IMF.    As long as the IMF and the Japanese government could agree on 
the course of action in dealing with the crisis, it did not cause any serious problem.   
But as the crisis spread from Thailand to Indonesia and South Korea to Malaysia, it 
found itself increasingly in disagreement with the IMF and the US.    The first instance 
of disagreement took place in September and October 1997 with the creation of the 
AMF as the central issue. 
The onset of the crisis also exposed the fact that the US had engaged regional 
economic development differently and thus had interests which were different from 
Japanese.    While Japan drove regional economic development with its FDIs, 
government aid and market opening measures, the US rode on it with its short-term 
portfolio  investment.  While  Japan’s  interests in the region were primarily industrial, 
US interests were financial.    This was due to the changes in the nature of American 
economy and national welfare.    With the great majority of Americans investing their 
savings in stock and bond markets in the US and abroad in the 1990s, US national 
interests had come to be defined primarily in financial terms and embedded in US-led 
and dominated financial globalization and liberalization.     
Japan and the US were also in disagreement about the causes of the crisis.   
The US government and the IMF argued that the causes of the crisis lay in crony 
capitalism, that the crisis demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Japanese model and 
authoritarian developmentalism and that the crisis had better be addressed with 
structural reforms.    But it is a folly to mix up industrial policies with cronyism and 
corruption and the short-term efficiency in resource allocation with long-term national 
welfare.      Free market ideas of legal contracts, impartial regulations, and transparency 
are all fine, and perhaps they are all portfolio investors need.    But they are not enough   8
for long term investment for industrialization, technological development, and human 
resources development.    At issue was not whether developmental states were to be 
replaced by market capitalism as the criticism of crony capitalism implied, but what mix 
of institutional mechanisms were needed to reduce market uncertainties for long-term 
economic development and national welfare. The Japanese government thus argued that 
it was caused by the massive outflow of short-term capital and that it had to be 
addressed with the creation of a coopration mechanism for currency and financial 
stability.    
The US and Japan with their different interests in the region and their different 
understanding of the crisis dealt with the crisis differently.    This became evident in 
October 1997.    When the crisis started in Thailand in July 1997, the US did not even 
participate in the Japan- and IMF-led rescue plan for Thailand and did not provide any 
fund for Thailand.
iv    When the Japanese government called for the establishment of 
Asian Monetary Fund to create a mechanism of cooperation among Asian countries for 
the “orderly management” of short-term capital flows and the currency and financial 
stability, the US took it as a hegemonic challenge and opposed it strongly.    (US Deputy 
Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers called Vice Minister for International Finance 
Eisuke Sakakibara and told him “I thought you were a friend.”)
v    In a meeting held in 
Manila in October 1997, the Manila framework, a framework for Asian regional 
cooperation to achieve currency and financial stability was agreed on in place of the 
proposed AMF as a compromise measure: Japan thus gave up the AMF, while the US 
agreed on the creation of a cooperation mechanism built on bilateral cooperative 
arrangements for currency and financial stability. 
  The Japan-US disagreement also manifested itself in the process of making an 
IMF-led rescue plan for Indonesia in the same month.    At issue was whether or not to 
demand structural reforms as part of the IMF conditionality.    In support of its 
technocratic allies in the Indonesian government and in line with the mainstream 
understanding of the crisis in the US, the IMF argued for a rescue package which was 
larger than the one for Thailand and which was aimed at structural reforms including the 
suspension of the national car project (which one of Soeharto’s children controlled), the 
curtailment of government subsidies, and the restructuring of the troubled banking 
sector..    The Japanese government did not agree with the IMF and argued for a less 
ambitious package aimed at the stabilization of Indonesian Rupiah in the foreign   9
exchange market.    But the IMF ignored Japanese opposition. And because the 
negotiation took place between the Indonesian government and the IMF, there was 
nothing the Japanese government could do but to go along with the IMF.    Japan 
pledged $5 billion when the $40 billion rescue package was agreed on for Indonesia.     
But this IMF rescue package did not work as it was hoped.    Upon signing the 
agreement, the Indonesian government immediately closed sixteen troubled banks as the 
IMF conditionality required.    This caused bank runs and led to a systemic crisis of the 
banking system in Indonesia.    The Indonesian government also announced the 
suspension of government projects, but in a few days many of those projects, most of 
them controlled by Soeharto’s children and cronies, were revived.    The Rupiah 
plummeted.    Money relocated from Indonesia to Singapore and converted to US dollar.   
Inflation  soared.  Anti-Chinese  riots  and  disturbances took place in many places.   
Then in December 1997, Soeharto fell ill and it was announced that he would not attend 
the ASEAN summit meeting.    This transformed the crisis fron an economic crisis into 
a political and social crisis.    The collapse of the IMF rescue package agreed on in 
October was clear for everyone.     
But the disagreement continued between Japan and the US.    The US insisted 
on structural reforms, and by the time the second IMF package was agreed on in 
January 1998, it was clear that the US wanted Soeharto to go.
vi  Needless  to  say, 
Soehareto understood this very well and wanted to wage what he called “guerrilla 
warfare.”    He thus let the IMF spell out all the structural reform measures it wanted 
(which ammounted to over one hundred) without any intention to meet the 
conditionality.  Instead,  he  entertained  the  the possibility of introducing a currency 
board system as a way out, while mentioning it as the IMF plus.    Both Japan and the 
US were alarmed, for the ill-timed introduction of a currency board system would 
instantly deplete Indonesia’s foreign reserves and devastate the Indonesian economy on 
behalf of Soeharto’s children and cronies who would seize a small window of 
opportunity it would provided for their own bailout.  President  Clinton  sent  former 
Vice President Mondale in March 1998 to dissuade Soeharto from the introduction of a 
currency board system, but now very suspicious of US intentions, Soeharto was in no 
mood to listen to the US envoy.    The meeting which lasted only for 30 minutes was cut 
short, after Soeharto angrily rejected the idea of political reform, his exit to put it more 
starkly, suggested by Mondale.    Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Hashimoto also   10
visited Indonesia, met with Soeharto, persuaded him not to introduce the currency board 
system and opened the way for yet another IMF rescue package which was to be agreed 
on in April 1998, even though it was too late to bailout Soeharto. 
The showdown then came in September and October of 1998, when the 
Malaysian government under Prime Minister Mahathir introduced capital control, 
instituted a fixed exchange rate system, lowered the interest rate, and turned to an 
expansionary Keynesian policy, when the crisis spread from East Asia to Russia, Brazil 
and the Wall Street and when the LTCM, hit by the crisis in Russia, had to be bailed out.     
The US was outraged at the introduction of capital control in Malaysia (and feared that 
it might spread to other countries and hurt the Wall Street) as well as the ouster of 
Duputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.    But the Japanese government supported 
Mahathir and defended the Malaysian policy package, because it was in line with its 
position that the massive outflow of short-term capital was the major culprit of the crisis 
and that East Asia economies, devasted by the crisis, needed stimuli.    Japan and the US 
made a deal in October 1998 and agreed that Japan would acquiesce with the US bailing 
out Brazil with the special IMF facility, while the US would not oppose Japan to 
introduce a new regional Keysian policy package, the new Miyazawa initiative, and 
support Mahathir’s Malaysia.
vii 
  The new Miyazawa Initiative, announced in October 1998, thus marked a 
clear departure in Japan’s engagement of East Asia.    It signified that Japan now had a 
regional policy for East Asia.    It made available $15 billion short-term capital for the 
financial and currency stabilization and another $15 billion long-term capital for 
economic recovery.    East Asian economies were devasted in the crisis – the Thai 
economy contracted by 10.2 percent in 1998, the Malaysia economy by 7.5 percent, and 
the Indonesian economy by 13.2 percent.    The new Miyazawa initiative was meant to 
provide fund for stabilizing their currencies and finances and for Keysina policy 
measures to expand domestic demands, to create jobs and to provide social safety 
networks for maintaining social stability.    An office was created at the ministry of 
finance for East Asian currency and financial affairs.    Directors at its International 
Affairs bureau were assigned to oversee its implementation in Malaysia and the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea.     
By February 2000, $13.5 billion was provided to Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia within the framework of the new Miyazawa   11
initiative and spent largely for for public works and job creation.
viii  T h e   n e w  
Miyazawa initiative also made available up to $5 billion and $2.5 billion each to South 
Korea and Malaysia for short-term currency and financial stability.    This paved the 
way for the future Chiengmai Initiative.    Its framework agreed on in 1997 as the 
Manila framework, the Chiengmai Initiative was designed as multiplying bilateral 
bilateral currency swap agreements such as Japan-Korea and Japan-Malaysia currency 
swap agreements among ASEAN plus 3 countries and to create a mechanism for a zone 
of currency and financial stability and was formally agreed on at the ASEAN plus 3 
summit meeting in May 2000 in Chiengmai.    The US with the IMF as its proxy 
remained hegemonic in the region, but Japan expanded its freedom of action marginally 




Thailand in crisis 
National developments in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia during the crisis 
years can usefully be understood within the framework of US-Japan regional 
cooperation and rivalry as  discussed  above.   
Thailand benefited enormously from a long period of economic development 
from the late 1950s to the late 1990s which culminated in the economic boom in 
1987-1995 and led to the rise of middle classes and the transition and consolidation of 
Thai politics from authoritarinism  to  democracy.  This  history is well known.    Open 
politics, which the student revolution ushered in in 1973 and in which small urban 
middle classes as well as peasants and workers for the first time in Thai history 
emerged as political forces, was truncated with the counter revolutionary coup in 1976 
and was replaced by power sharing, often called half-democracy, because the military 
and bureaucratic elite could no longer ignore urban middle classes at a time when 
Indochina went communist and thousands of student activists joined the communist 
insurgency in the jungle to fight for the  revolution.  The  military and bureaucratic 
elite were thus willing to share power with party politicians and business elite.   
Though neither Kriangsak nor Prem were elected members of the parliament, the 
governmental stability under their leadership depended on their success in forming and 
sustaining a governing coalition of political parties as much as obtaining and   12
maintaining the support of the military.    In this period of half-democracy, local bosses 
emerged as party politicians and came to dominate agrarian-based parties, capitalizing 
on income disparities between Bangkok and provinces, mobilizing agrarian support 
with public works and outright vote buying, and making politics a money-making 
business. 
The half-democracy reached a major turning point in 1991 with Chatichai 
Choonhavan’s ascendancy to power.    While the military was the senior partner and 
political parties the junior under Prem, the rise of party politician Chatchai Choonhavan 
as prime minister threatened to relegate the military to the junior partner position.    The 
military under Suchinda struck back, staging a successful coup for the first time in more 
than a decade and appointed Anan Panyarachun, a diplomat-turned-business leader, 
prime  minister.  Middle-class  people  in Bangkok neither supported nor opposed the 
coup, because they were dismayed by the corruption which was the hallmark of 
Chatchai Choonhavan and his lieutenants, local bosses turned party bosses, because 
Suchinda promised a return to civilian politics in the near future, and because Prime 
Minister Anan Panyarachun appointed professionals in important ministerial positions 
and initiated many deregulation measures.    When Suchinda became prime minister in 
1992 and threatened to prolong the military dominance in politics, however, they rose in 
opposition.    In the February 1992 elections, parties in support of Suchinda obtained 
195 parliamentary seats out of 350, but won only two out of 35 in Bangkok.    There 
were huge demonstrations in Bangkok in May 1992, culminating in troops shooting and 
killing demonstrators and in Suchinda’s resignation as prime minister.    This 
development was hailed as a successful “middle class revolt,” reminscent of the student 
revolution 19 years earlier, though studies show that middle classes did not provide 
major troops for demonstrations and that the myth of middle class revolt was created 
more in subsequent journalistic representation than on the streets.     
The middle class hegemony, however, was far from complete, for 
middle-class Thailand as Sarit envisioned it with the great majority of Thais enjoying 
middle-class status, income and life had not come about.    Those who benefited from 
economic development remained limited to urban middle classes in Bangkok, while 
those in the provinces, above all peasants and farmers which formed more than half of 
the population, remained outside the sphere of prosperity.    This was due to the 
economic structure.    Thai economy grew by 7 percent annually in 1960-1980 and   13
after an interval of slower growth in the early 1980s, grew by 8 percent annually in 
1987-1996.    But this economic development mainly took place in Bangkok and its 
vicinities and disproportionately benefited the Bangkok middle classes in the making.   
Denied opportunities for high-school, let alone university, education, peasants and 
farmers in the provinces either remained in the agricultural sector of declining 
productivity or migrated to Bangkok as unskilled workers on the short-term contract 
basis.  The  Thai  agricultural  population  constituted more than 50 percent of the 
working population even in the 1990s (while the GDP share of agricultural sector 
declined to 11 percent in 1995).    Thus resulted a huge and expanding per capita 
income disparity between the provinces and the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.    The per 
capita regional GDP in Bangkok was nine times larger than that in the Northeast, the 
poorest region with one third of the Thai population in the 1990s.    And even in 1988, 
at the beginning of the boom, Bangkok middle-class people were already making four 
to six times more money than peasants and farmers in the provinces.    The generals 
and bureaucrats could thus claim to be the “true” representatives and protectors of the 
silent majority of peasants and farmers. In the institutions of representative democracy, 
peasants and farmers dominated the franchise.    At elections, their votes were 
influenced by the bureaucratic power of the army and the Ministry of Interior, and by 
the money and local influence of local bosses, jao phor.    For the metropolitan 
business interests, the countryside remained a new and unexplored political frontier.
ix  
Equally important, no “catch-all” party that could have brokered among 
urban and rural constituencies came into being.    Thai party politics was thus 
characterized by shifting coalitions, and coalition governments lacked stability because 
the departure of just one of the coalition partners could bring down the whole 
government.    In this party politics, the urban-rural division divided parties.    In the 
July 1995 elections, for instance, the Thai National Party, with politicians known for 
their corruption and vote buying, emerged as the majority party in the provinces and its 
party president, Barnharn, was elected as prime minister.      But the party did not win 
even a single seat in Bangkok.    This was repeated in the 1996 elections, in which the 
New Aspiration Party under Chaovalit emerged victorious, but won only one seat in 
Bangkok and even all the six parties in his governing coalition combined could win 
seven out of 37 seats.    The major issue in these elections was corruption and vote 
buying.    It was natural for agrarian voters to sell their votes for whatever money they   14
could obtain when they knew they could not get any benefit from parliamentary 
politics in any other way.      It was also natural that politicians, once elected, tried to 
get their investment return through corruption and money making.    But Bangkok 
middle classes found it repugnant, and respectable Bangkok newspapers exposed 
corruption scandals to represent  their  views.   
In the mid 1990s, this war was fought in the process of constitution-making.   
Middle-class cultural hegemony worked in their favor from the beginning.    It was 
decided that the committee for constitutional amendment be composed of university 
graduates even though university graduates constituted only 2.5 percent of the Thai 
population aged 20 and above.
x    The parliament dominated by parties and party 
bosses representing agrarian interests opposed constitutional revisions drafted by the 
committee. 
It was at this moment when the currency crisis hit Thailand.    Thailand had 
liberalized its financial sector and deregulated foreign-exchange controls and capital 
transactions in the late 1980s and early 1990s.    A major turning point came in 1993 
when the Thai government established an offshore financial center.    Financial inflow 
that started with the establishment of an off-shore banking facility turned into flood in 
1993-1995 with the out-in transactions which was 27.6 billion baht in 1987 and 
reached 650.4 billion baht in 1995.    Money went to the stock market and consumer 
loans.    It also went to real estate development, hotels, and big industrial projects in 
steel, petrochemicals, and cement.
xi    In 1994 alone, 77 new major housing 
development projects started and 250,000 housing units, three times as many as in 
1993, were newly supplied in the market.   This  real  estate bubble popped in 
1995-1996.    A state bank estimated that there were 275,000 housing units left unsold 
at the end of 1996 and 338,000 at the end of 1997.    Industrial estates and shopping 
centers also remained unsold and unrented.    Out of 75,000 rai space of industrial 
estates available in 1997, 24 percent remained empty, while 12 percent of 3.16 million 
square meter space shopping centers remained without tenants.
xii  Financial 
institutions experienced sudden deterioration in their balance sheets and a number of 
them became insolvent. 
With the Mexican currency crisis fresh in everyone’s memory, Thai Baht 
came under attack from sporadic speculation starting in January 1995, and in June 
1996 the IMF had advised the Thai monetary authority to take a more flexible   15
approach toward pegging their currency to the dollar.    But Bangkok delayed action 
for a year.    Only in June 1997 that it decided to suspend the operation of 16 insolvent 
financial institutions; only on July 2 did it allow the Baht to float in the foreign 
exchange market; and only on July 19 did it decide to ask the IMF for assistance.     
Why this delay?    What went wrong with the Thai government who was 
known historically for its sound macro-economic management?     
No doubt many factors were involved, but one factor stands out if seen from 
the Thai political economic structural perspective: the failure of Thai party politics.   
With the arrival of coalition governments in the 1990s, cabinet posts were distributed 
to coalition partners in proportion to the number of parliamentary seats each party 
controlled.    The ascendancy of party politics also undermined Thai technocracy.   
The development planning agency at the prime minister’s office, which had once 
served as the central staff of the Thai authoritarian developmental state, was 
transformed into a center for distributing pork barrels among coalition parties and party 
politicians, while the central bank had to be careful not to hurt powerful interests with 
its financial and currency policy measures.    At the heart of this party power was the 
fact that parties in coaliton as well as party bosses who owned those coalition parties 
could veto any policy measure that might harm their own interests, threateing to bolt 
the governing coalition and cause it to collapse.    It was this Thai political economic 
structure, infested by numerous veto groups, that prevented the government from 
dealing with the crisis in the making timely.    Initially the Thai government did not 
want to come to the IMF for assistance, because it knew it would be required to take 
measures that might harm powerful interests.    But Japan unwilling to come to their 
rescue alone and Thai foreign eserves almost totally depleted, it had no recourse but to 
come to the IMF for assistance and to float its currency. 
Thailand thus came under the IMF management in August 1997.    The 
showdown took place shortly thereafter.    The Thai government under Prime Minister 
Chaovalit raised taxes on gasoline and diesel oil as required by the IMF in its 
conditionality in October 1997, but retracted the measure when it was opposed 
strongly by a coalition partner.    The finance minister resigned in protest and the 
government collapsed.    Chaovalit lost his national and international credibility and 
was replaced by Chuan Leekpai, who as Prime Minister assembed a Democratic 
Party-led new reformist coalition government with the strong representation of urban   16
intersts, shut down 56 failed financial institutions as required by the IMF, and 
embarked on structural reforms.    The government under the IMF conditionality, veto 
groups could no longer have their way in economic policy decisions by taking the 
governmental stability as hostage.     
The coalition government under Chuan was also successful in passing the 
constitutional revision in its early months, because parties, whether in government or 
in opposition, could not afford to vote down constitutional amendment and deepen the 
economic crisis into a political crisis.    The new constitution required parliamentary 
members and cabinet ministers to have university degrees, making it hard for local 
bosses who made money in illegal gambling, prostitution and hotel business and 
dominated agrarian-based parties to become parliamentary members and cabinet 
ministers.    Furthermore it prohibited parliamentary members from serving as cabinet 
ministers, making it hard for politicians to make money with public works and 
corruption.    And it made the senate elective, denying the military the parliamentary 
arena.    The middle class cultural hegemony was thus successfully translated into 
political  power.   
But the crisis hit Bangkok’s middle classes as well as other classes all the 
same.    Many financial and banking institutions closed and MNCs shutting down their 
operations, more than 1 million workers lost their jobs.    According to a labor survey in 
August 1998, 25,000 professionals and 25,000 office workers as well as 43,000 factory 
workers were without job out of 136,000 workers identified as unemployed in Bangkok, 
while 500,000 out of 700,000 university graduates entering the labor market were 
expected to find no jobs.
xiii    This was where the new Miyazawa Initiative mattered.   
The Thai government decided on March 30, 1999 on the economic policy package with 
the total funding of 131 billion Baht, of which 13 billion Baht was earmarked for job 
creation and 40 billion Baht for the purchase of goods and services.    The next day the 
Japanese government disbursed the fund totalling 52.4 billion Baht to Thailand, half of 
which, 26 billion Baht that is, was spent on public owrks and job creation.    The 
Miyazawa money as it was called in Thailand was instrumental not only in the Thai 
government turning to reflationary policy, but also and equally importantly in sustaining 
the Democratic Party-led coalition government under Chuan in power.. 
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The Collapse of Indonesia’s New Order 
In Indonesia Soeharto fashioned his New Order regime with the state as his 
power base and the army as its backbone.    It was centralized, militarized, authoritarian, 
and brutal.    Army officers dominated the military and occupied stratgegic positions in 
the civilian arm of the state as district chiefs, mayors, provincial governors, secretaries 
general and ministers in the name of dual functions.    But the state was only in part 
funded with the formal budget; its informal or “off-budget” funding, sourced from state 
corporations and agencies such as Pertamina and Bulog and more recently from joint 
venture businesses with Soeharto’s lieutenants, crony business tycoons and family 
members, were of crucial importance and as such were tightly controlled by Soeharto 
and served as huge centrally controlled and directed patronage networks.       
With the state as his power base, Soeharto imposed his “national consensus” 
of Panca Sila Democracy on the Indonesian populace and banned all public discourses 
on religion, ethnicity, and class and ideologies other than his Panca Sila democracy in 
the name of stability and development. “Islamic” parties and organizations were forced 
to accept Panca Sila as their sole organizational principle.    Islamist activists were 
monitored, harassed, arrested, and forced to go underground.    Ethnic differences were 
museumized and celebrated. Religious and ethnic divisions thus contained, the 
government addressed the question of class divisions with its politics of stability and 
economic development, which sought to transform political issues into problems of 
output, to neutralize class conflict in favor of a consensus on growth in an authoritarian 
manner, all of which were premised on the “virtue” of political stability which leads to 
economic development which leads to the rising living standard which in turn leads to 
further political stability.     
This politics of stability and economic development, combined with the 
depoliticization and containment of religious and ethnic divisions, served Soeharto’s 
New Order regime well.    Yet it became clear in the 1990s that social divisions could no 
longer be contained as the regime itself underwent significant transformation in those 
years.    This change can best be summed up as a shift from a military regime to a 
personalistic/autocratic regime, because having outlived all the rivals of his generation, 
Soeharto emerged as the unrivalled strongman in the final decade of his rule.    Army 
officers who had served as his personal confidants dominated the military.    His family 
members, each building his/her own business empire, openly plundered the state with   18
impunity.    And Soeharto’s lieutenants -- his ministers, commanders, governors, district 
chiefs, and mayors -- followed their superior’s example to “privatize” the state.    The 
state thus became increasingly rotten, while retaining enormous power vis-à-vis society.   
In the meantime, secret wars were going on in Aceh and Irian Jaya (as well as in East 
Timor), killing Indonesians in the name of the Republic and destroying whatever 
popular trust the Republican state still enjoyed in those places.  Jakartan  control  of 
powers and resources as well as Javanese domination of the state (the domination of 
mainly Javanese army officers over the military and civilian state agencies, that is) led 
to the rising demand for local autonomy and the appointment of putra daerah (literally, 
“local sons”) in strategic positions of provincial governors, district chiefs and mayors.   
Transmigration, forest exploitation, and the consequent disappearance of living space 
for local Dayaks in Kalimantan led to widespread ethnic violence against Madurese in 
East Kalimantan in 1996.    Furthermore, Islamic and Islamist forces found more space 
for political action with the establishment of ICMI in 1990, in part because, unsure 
about military support for his increasingly personalistic rule, Soeharto cultivated the 
support of pious Muslims and in part because Muslim middle classes, a product of 
economic development under the New Order, embraced the teachings and tenets of 
Islam, more seriously.   
The economic crisis thus hit Indonesia in 1997 at a time when it became clear 
that the state was rotten and “privatized” and that social divisions could no longer be 
contained, threatening business empires, including those established and owned by 
Soeharto’s family members, cronies, and lieutenants, with bankrupcy.    It also 
threatened to destroy the informal funding mechanism of the state, a mainstay of 
Soeharto’s long-staying patronage power..    This was due to the enormous 
transformation the Indonesian political economy had undergone in the boom years from 
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.    Indonesian economy posted 6.7 percent annual 
growth in the post-Plaza Accord boom years of 1987-1997.    While the economic 
development in the 1970s was state-led and state-funded, the boom in the late 1980s and 
1990s was led by the private-sector dominated by Sino-Indonesian business tycoons and 
Soeharto’s  family  members.  Financial  liberalization in the late 1980s made it possible 
for business groups to establish their own banks and brought in huge 
dollar-denominated loans to expand their business operations.    This meant two things.   
First, while Indonesia’s external debts in the 1980s were public debts with the   19
government backing them, many of those in the 1990s were private-sector debts.    The 
government’s macro-economic management machanism in place which was geared to 
deal with public debts did not function well in overseeing private sector debts that had 
been built up in the 1990s.    Second, the corporate governance structure in the banking 
sector was hopelessly comprovised by Soeharto’s children and cronies.    Management 
of the state banks was under the supervision of the finance ministry and was vulnerable 
to political pressure.    When Soeharto’s lieutenants, his children and/or finance ministry 
officials came calling, bankers felt compelled to extend loans even for projects they 
knew would not be feasible and when loans soured, they concealed the problems.    The 
non-performing loans of state banks thus swelled in the 1990s.    Private sector banks 
also accumulated bad loans.    Established to serve business groups that had set them up, 
private sector banks brought in short-term dollar-denominated funds from foreign 
sources at hight interest rates and funded their group firms, even when some of those 
firms were in trouble.     
    When the crisis started in Bangkok in July 1997, the Indonesian economy was 
still doing very well.    Its economy was growing by 7.5 percent annually; its export was 
increasing by 10.4 percent; its budget deficit was below 2 percent of the GDP; it had 
$21 billion foreign reserves; its inflation was under control; and its Rupiah looked stable.   
Confident of sound economic fundamentals, technocrats seized this opportunity of 
“mini-crisis” to persuade Soeharto to introduce structural reforms as they deemed fit 
with the help of the IMF and to address structural problems such as expanding bad loans 
in the banking sector, the dependence of business groups on short-term 
dollar-denominated funds from foreign sources, and the control of Soeharto’s children, 
lieutenants, and crony business tycoons over commanding heights of the Indonesian 
economy.   
When there were signs that the crisis was spreading to Indonesia, the 
government thus announced a comprehensive economic policy package in September 
1997, which technocrats called their own IMF conditionality and called for the financial 
and fiscal tightening and structural reforms including the suspension of government 
development projects and the banking sector  reform.  Technocrats  also  persuaded 
Soeharto to ask for an IMF assistance to sustain the international confidence and in 
October 1997 concluded an agreement with the IMF, which required, among others, the 
closure of sixteen private banks (including the one owned by Soeharto’s son) and other   20
structural  reform  measures.  In  Thailand,  coalition partners could no longer take 
governmental stability as a hostage to veto policy measures they did not like after the 
collapse of Caovalit government.     
But structural reforms the IMF required not only threatened to hurt business 
interests of Soeharto’s children, his crony business tycoons and his lieutenants, but also 
to undermine Soeharto’s patronage networks, the informal funding mechanism of state 
agencies, including the military.    When the government closed troubled banks and 
suspended government development projects right after it signed the agreement with the 
IMF, Soeharto learned he was duped.    He allowed his son to take over another bank 
and revived government development projects which the government suspended and 
which were controlled by his family and crony businesses.    The closure of banks also 
caused the bank run and led to the systemic crisis of the banking sector.    The 
agreement technocrats engineered with the IMF thus backfired.    Soeharto no longer 
trusted his technocrats, above all finance minister and the central banker.    The lack of 
commitment on the part of Soeharto to structural reforms was exposed, and Rupiah 
slided  down  further.    
  Then, in December 1997, Soeharto fell seriously ill and did not attend the 
ASEAN summit meeting.    This instantly transformed the crisis from an economic 
crisis to a political and social crisis.    Rupiah plummeted by 70 percent, raaching 
10,000 Rupiah a dollar in January 1998.    Unable to repay their dollar-denominated 
loans, many business groups, including those established and owned by Soeharto’s 
relatives and cronies, went bankrupt.    The informal funding mechanism of the state, a 
mainstay of Soeharto’s long-staying power., was also destroyed.  Prices  of  goods, 
including rice, cooking oil and sugar, rose steeply.    The social crisis manifested itself 
in increasing unemployment, widespread anti-Chinese riots, lootings, disturbances, and 
rising criminality.    A new IMF program was worked out with Soeharto in January 1998 
– technocrats were no longer consulted by Soeharto - which was replaced by yet another 
one in April 1998.    But no IMF programs were doomed.    The crisis destroyed 
Soeharto’s politics of stability and economic development and led to the fall of his 
regime in the wake of massive riots in Jakarta and elsewhere in May 1998. 
 
 
The Survival of Mahathir’s Malaysia   21
A plural society par excellence where maintaining an ethnic peace is of 
paramount importance as a condition of national life, Malaysia has been under the 
National Front (NF) government since the early 1970s.    It is a governing coalition of 
ethnic and regional parties led and dominated by the UMNO, United Malay National 
Organization.  The  NF  has  controlled more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, 
while the UMNO has controlled more than half of the parliamentary seats the NF holds.   
The UMNO dominance in the NF and the parliament thus beyond any doubt, it has run 
the NF government for the past thirty years and made it its stated objective to create 
Malay middle classes.    Its New Economic Policy (NEP) as well as its successor 
National Development Policy (NDP) have been geared in part to achieving this 
objective, improving Malay social and economic positions and creating Malay middle 
classes with state-led economic and educational development, while lulling 
non-Malays with the FDI-led export-oriented economic growth.    Quotas were 
introduced for Malay employment in business and Malay enrollment in universities.   
Malay replaced English as the language of medium at the high-school and university 
level.    The Malay corporate share of 30 percent was targetted.    Many public 
corporations were established by the central and state goverments to create Malay 
business elite.    Malay middle classes were thus produced in the public sector in the 
1970s.   
But the Malaysian economy slowed down, shortly after Mahathir came to 
power in 1981.    Oil revenues collapsed, public corporations performed badly, and 
government debts, both central and state, mounted. This forced Mahathir to modify the 
NEP developmental strategy.    In alliance with Japanese corporations, he embarked on 
heavy industrialization with the establishment of the HICOM, the Heavy Industries of 
Malaysia, and started the Proton national car project to develop Malay human 
resources and technological capabilities and to promote Malay-led supporting 
industries.
xiv    He also shifted his developmental emphasis from the public sector to 
the private and started privatizing public corporations to create Malay business elite.   
Government officials as well as executives and managers of public corporations 
migrated from the public sector to the private and were transformed into Malay 
business  elite.  (There  also  developed Japanese and Taiwanese FDI-led 
export-oriented industrial sectors, above all electronic industries, in the same boom 
years, but this development benefited non-Malay middle classes more than Malay.)       22
The economic development and the rise of Malay and Chinese new urban 
middle classes drastically changed the Malaysian political economic structure in the 
pre-crisis Mahathir years (1981-1997).    The ethnic divisions remained as the most 
important division in Malaysian politics.    But the rise of Malay and non-Malay 
middle classes made its effect felt in Malaysian politics.    In the first place, the UMNO 
became more business-oriented.    Its traditional social bases were among peasants and 
farmers, civil servents (working for central and state governments and public 
corporations), and school teachers.    In the 1981 party congress, for instance, 40 
percent of delegates were school teachers.    By the late 1980s, however, business 
executives and managers emerged as a major force in the party.    In the 1987 party 
congress, 25 percent of delegates were business executives and managers, while 19 
percent were school teachers and 23 percent civil servants, though only 1.4 percent of 
the Malay working population were classified as executives and managers even in 
1990.
xv 
The UMNO became business-oriented in yet another sense in the 1980s and 
1990s.    With the establishment of Fleet Holdings as its business arm, the UMNO went 
into business in a major way, investing in food processing, hotels, and real estate 
development.    Its branches followed suit.    As a result, more than 160,000 firms were 
established by the UMNO central leadership, its branches, and its party leaders by the 
mid-1990s.    Mahathir’s privatization policy and the BOT scheme he introduced for 
large-scale infrastructural development projects (such as the North-South highway) 
also worked for the UMNO’s business orientation.    The logic that informed it was 
straight-forward.  The  UMNO  leadership, which controlled the government, 
distributed business opportunities to its supporters.    To obtain business in public 
works, government-funded development projects and BOT projects, business 
executives and managers joined the party to control important positions in the party 
organization at the state, branch, and district levels.    To get elected to important party 
positions, they spent money for election campaign, and once elected, they naturally 
tried to recoup their investment, if necessary, establishing new UMNO firms, obtaining 
business opportunities in public works, government funded development projects, and 
BOT projects, and demanding that the government and the party central leadership 
distribute more business opportunities to UMNO members and business entities.     
In the second place, Islamic revival among the rising Malay middle class   23
people also deeply affected the UMNO.    Not only Malay- and Arabic-educated, but 
also and more significantly the increasing number of English-educated Malays have 
come to follow the straitlaced, Arab-type Islam.
xvi    The UMNO leadership tried to 
coopt Islamic revivalist forces.    Anwar Ibrahim, ABIM chairman, joined the UMNO, 
ran successfully for the parliamentary in the early 1980s, was awarded a cabinet post, 
and rose in the party hierarchy to become deputy prime minister in 1993.     
The UMNO in the 1980s and 1990s thus presented itself to the Malay 
community as the guardian of Malay economic interests and Malay Islamic Identity.   
The UMNO leadership under Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim in 1993-1998 embodied 
this double guardianship.    But all was not well with the UMNO and its central 
leadership.    For one thing, Malays remained dependent on the state and did not 
become as competitive as Chinese, as Mahathir hoped.    For another, ethnic 
divisions remained.    In 1991, Mahathir announced Vision 2020, setting the goal 
that Malaysia join the group of advanced industrial countries by 2020, with the 7 
percent annual growth for the coming twenty years and the nation-building based 
on Malaysian national consciousness.    The nexus between the high economic 
growth and nation building was easy to see: mobilizing non-Malay human resources 
and capital was imperative to achieve the 7 percent annual economic growth.    In a 
symbolic move, the government deregulated and liberalized the university 
educational system and approved the establishment of private university educations 
for non-Malay students in the mid-1990s.    The government also institutionalized 
policy consultation mechanisms with the private sector, in part represented by 
Chinese entrepreneurs.     
Yet it was generational power struggle that almost wrecked the UMNO and 
the UMNO-dominated NF regime.    It started with the rise of Anwar Ibrahim as 
deputy prime minister in 1993.    Former ABIM activists and young business 
executives and entrepreneurs rose on his coat-tail, obtaining business opportunities in 
public works, government funded development projects and BOT projects.    But it was 
Mahathir, not Anwar, who had the final say in the distribution of business opportunities.   
This set the stage for the power struggle between Prime Minister Mahathir and his 
deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, in the crisis years of 1997 and 1998.    No doubt their positions 
were different as regards how to deal with the crisis.    Anwar called for the budget 
tightening and criticized cronyism, while Mahathir opted for an economic stimulus   24
package and wanted to bail out troubled Malay firms and banks.    But it is too 
simplictic to see Anwar as pro-IMF, pro-US reformist and Mahathir as anti-IMF, 
anti-US, for the generational power struggle was at the heart of their rivalry.    When 
the crisis spread to Malaysia, Anwar announced a strategic plan for the economic and 
fiscal stabilization in December 1997 to overcome the crisis with the high interest rate 
and tight fiscal policy package.    This naturally put a brake on the economy and not a 
few firms and banks ran into trouble.    The National Economic Action Council 
(NEAC) was established by Mahathir in January 1998 in the prime minister’s office 
with Daim as secretary general, who looked for ways to stimulate growth with the 
promotion of foreign and Chinese capital investment.    In the meantime the Renon 
group, a major UMNO-related business group, as well as banks close to the 
government fell in trouble, and the disagreement deepened between the Anwar-led 
financial authority and the Mahathir-led prime minister’s office as regards the bail-out 
of those firms and banks.     
It was in this context that Anwar initiated an all out attack on Mahathir at the 
UMNO party congress in June 1998.    The UMNO Youth spearheaded as 
anti-Mahathir force in support of Anwar and attacked the Malay-first policy as 
represented by the NEP/NDP as “crony economy.”    But Anwar and his allies failed in 
ousting Mahathir as UMNO President at the congress.    Anwar changed his policy 
position, announced an economic stimulus package and asked the Japanese 
government to resume yen loans to Malaysia, while the NEAC under Daim decided on 
the final report, a national economic reconstruction plan, at the end of July and lowered 
the interest rate in view of the contraction of Malaysian economy by 6.8 percent in the 
second quarter of 1998.    Thispolicy change was accompanied by the resignation of 
Anwar’s allies at the central bank, and the leadership in economic policy making fell in 
the hands of Mahathir and Daim.       
What followed is well known.    On September 1, 1998, the Malaysian 
government announced the introduction of capital control and the fixed foreign 
exchange rate system.    On September 2, Anwar Ibrahim was ousted as deputy prime 
minister and finance minister.    On September 4, Anwar and his allies were kicked out 
of the UMNO.    Young middle-class Malays were outraged at the development and the 
way Anwar was treated (i.e., arrested, tried for sodomy, and sentenced to imprisonment).   
The US was also outraged because it feared that the capital control the Malaysian   25
government might spread to other countries hit by the crisis.    Malaysia fell in crisis.   
But the crisis was also spreading beyond East Asia  in  these  months.  Russia  defaulted.  
Brazil went into crisis.    US hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, went almost 
bankrupt only to be bailed out at the last minute by a government-orchestrated 
consortium.   
Up until then, the US position was that the crisis was a regional problem and 
insisted on structural reforms wherever it hit.    In October 1998, however, the US was 
forced to admit that the crisis could be global and might hit the US itself, because the 
Wall Street was threatened with the crisis in Russia, Brazil and the LTCM.    The US 
government wanted to establish a special account at IMF to bail out Brazil.    But it was 
opposed by the EU, because the EU argued that Brazil should devalue its currency, as 
Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea did, which would be a big blow to the Wall 
Street.   
The Japanese government then came in.    The US and Japan made a deal: the 
US could go ahead with establishing a special account at IMF to bail out Brazil and 
Japan would not make fuss about it; while Japan would start the new Miyazawa 
initiative in East Asia as an international Keynesian policy package to revive East Asian 
economies and provide financial support to Malaysia, the country which had become 
the target of criticism in Washington and New York, because of the imposition of capital 
control and the ousting of deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim. 
Mahathir thus survived the crisis.    In the 1999 elections, the generational 
division in the Malay community manifested itself.    The NF obtained 148 seats, more 
than two thirds of the parliamentary seats, though it was down from 162 it won in the 
1995 elections and the UMNO won only 72 seats, down from 89 it won in 1995 which 
was less than half of the NF seats.    But the NF regime remained in place, and so did 
Mahathir  in  power.   
 
 
  In retrospect it is clear that the crisis was dealt with at two levels    It was 
dealt with regionally and globally by the IMF, the US and Japan, and it was dealt with 
nationally by national governments in consultation and negotiation with the IMF.    On 
the regional and global level, Japan became increasingly    frustrated with the way in 
which the crisis was dealt with by the IMF and the US, in part because of the different   26
understanding of the nature of the crisis and in part because of the different interests 
Japan had in the region.    Japan worked with the IMF when Thailand fell in crisis, 
acquiesced with the IMF policy when Indonesia went to the IMF for assistance, and 
chose to support Mahathir in disagreement with the US when Malaysia fell in crisis in 
1998.   
This cooperation and rivalry between Japan and the US (with the IMF as its 
proxy) affected the way in which the crisis ran its course in Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, even though the political economic structure in each country was of prime 
importance.    In Thailand, therefore, a coalition government willing to work with the 
IMF and Japan had to be in place to introduce reforms as required by the IMF 
conditionality and was supported by Japan with the new Miyazawa Initiative; 
Soeharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia was too rotten for any rescue measures and 
had to go; while in Malaysia Japan’s support with the new Miyazawa Initiative was 
decisive in the survival of Mahathir and the NF regime under his leadership.     
                                                 
i        For more on the regional structure, see Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, 
ed., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), above all 
the concluding chapter. 
ii    Charles  S.  Maier,  “The  Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American 
International Economic Policy after World War II,” in Between Power and Plenty: 
Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. 
iii      Policy Speech by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto [Provisional Translation], 
“Reforms for the New Era of Japan and ASEAN - For a Broader and Deeper 
Partnership -,” January 14, 1997.) 
iv      US Deputy Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers said this in a speech he 
made about the WTO’s financial services negotiations in which the US was pressing for 
opening of countries’ financial sectors to outside competition: With hindsight, the lessor 
of Thailand is . . . that relatively open capital markets, independent monetary policy, a 
fixed exchange rate, and a current account deficit of eight per cent of GDP do not mix.   
The speculative activity we saw in the weeks leading to the crisis was the result – not 
the causes – of Thailand’s problems.    The unsustainable macro-economic policy mix, 
combined with highly inefficient domestic intermediation and a poorly equipped   27
                                                                                                                                               
regulatory regime, had given banks the freedom – and incentive – to becme heavily 
overextended.    The lack of transparent and timely balance sheets and other information 
meant there was little early warning that this was taking place.    The US government 
thus was of the opinion that Thailand’s crisis was self-inflicted and therefore that the 
fault lay completely with Thailand.    John Laird, Money Politics, Globalization, and 
Crisis (Singapore: Graham Brash, 2000), pp. 87-88. 
v   Eisuke  Sakakibara, 
vi      An interagency meeting was held at the White House shortly before deputy 
treasury secretary Laurence Summers and deputy secretary of state for Asia Pacific 
Stanley Ross were sent to Indonesia in mid January 1998.    It was reported that 
Laurence Summers was convinced that Soeharto had to go and that he made this point 
forcefully at the meeting. 
vii   (Sakakibara:  222-23). 
viii    It was not all the fund the Japanese government provided in the crisis years to East 
Asian governments.    By May 1999 Japan had agreed to fund projects worth $64 
billion, which was equivalent with 40 percent of Japan’s export to East Asia ($152.3 
billion) and 60 percent of Japan’s loan assets ($74.6 billion) in the region.     
ix    See Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 364; Tsuruyo Funatsu and Kazuhiro 
Kagotani, “Tai no Chukanso: Toshi Gakureki Erito no Seisei to Shakai Ishiki,” in 
Hattori Tamio, Funatsu Tsuruyo and Torii Takashi, eds., Ajia Chukan-so no Seisei to 
Tokushitu (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, 2002), pp. 206. 
x    Yasuhito Asami, “Chukan-so no Zodai to Seiji-ishiki no Henka,” in Tasaka, Toshio, 
ed., Ajia no Dai Toshi: Bangkok (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoron-sha, 1998), pp. 321-322. 
xi    Eiichi Shindo, Ajia Keizai Kiki wo Yomitoku (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha, 
1999), pp. 118-121. 
xii    Toshio Tasaka, “Bangkok Sekai-toshi-ka Kasetsu,” in Tasaka, Toshio, ed., Ajia no 
Dai Toshi: Bangkok (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoron-sha, 1998), p. 13.   
xiii    Tsuruyo Funatsu and Kazuhiro Kagotani, “Tai no Chukanso,” in Hattori Tamio, 
Funatsu Tsuruyo and Torii Takashi, eds., Ajia Chukan-so no Seisei to Tokushitu, p.. 
227.    28
                                                                                                                                               
xiv    Takashi Torii, “Malaysia no Chukanso Soshutsu no Mekanizumu: Kokka Shudo ni 
yoru Ikusei,” in Hattori Tamio, Funatsu Tsuruyo and Torii Takashi, eds., Ajia 
Chukan-so no Seisei to Tokushitu, pp. 154-155. 
xv    Takashi Torii, “Malaysia no Kaihatsu Senryaku to Seiji Hendo,” in Suehiro, Akira, 
and Yamakage Susumu, eds., Ajia Seiji Keizai Ron: Ajia no naka no Nihon wo 
mezashite (Tokyo: NTT Shuppan, 2001), pp. 115-116.   
xvi    A.B. Shamsul, “From Orang Kaya Baru to Melayu Baru: cultural construction of 
the Malay ‘new rich’,” in Pinches, Michael, ed., Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 110.     